Defending moral precaution as a solution to the problem of other minds : a reply to Holm and Coggon. by Pattinson,  Shaun D. & Beyleveld,  Deryck
Durham Research Online
Deposited in DRO:
01 June 2012
Version of attached file:
Accepted Version
Peer-review status of attached file:
Peer-reviewed
Citation for published item:
Pattinson, Shaun D. and Beyleveld, Deryck (2010) ’Defending moral precaution as a solution to the problem
of other minds : a reply to Holm and Coggon.’, Ratio Juris., 23 (2). pp. 258-273.
Further information on publisher’s website:
http://dx.doi.org/10.1111/j.1467-9337.2010.00453.x
Publisher’s copyright statement:
The definitive version is available at wileyonlinelibrary.com
Use policy
The full-text may be used and/or reproduced, and given to third parties in any format or medium, without prior permission or charge, for
personal research or study, educational, or not-for-profit purposes provided that:
• a full bibliographic reference is made to the original source
• a link is made to the metadata record in DRO
• the full-text is not changed in any way
The full-text must not be sold in any format or medium without the formal permission of the copyright holders.
Please consult the full DRO policy for further details.
Durham University Library, Stockton Road, Durham DH1 3LY, United Kingdom
Tel : +44 (0)191 334 3042 — Fax : +44 (0)191 334 2971
http://dro.dur.ac.uk
Defending Moral Precaution as a Solution to the Problem of Other Minds: A Reply 
to Holm and Coggon 
 
Deryck Beyleveld and Shaun D Pattinson 
 
Introduction 
 
In a paper published in this journal, Søren Holm and John Coggon (2009) address a thesis 
that we originally advanced together (Beyleveld and Pattinson 2000) and have 
subsequently developed individually and with others (e.g. Beyleveld and Brownsword 
2001, 2007; Pattinson 2002, 2006, 2009). This thesis is that precautionary reasoning, 
operating on the premise that there is a categorically binding moral principle that grants 
rights to agents―which we believe Alan Gewirth‘s Principle of Generic Consistency 
(PGC) to be (Gewirth 1978; Beyleveld 1991)―entails that apparent (or ―ostensible‖) 
non-agents are owed moral respect in proportion to the degree to which they approach 
being apparent agents. However, according to Holm and Coggon, ―[a]lthough there is no 
inherent intellectual flaw in the idea of precautionary reasoning, apart from a possible 
tendency towards conservatism‖, this application of it fails ―to provide a useful tool for 
guiding action‖ because 
 
(1) it pays insufficient attention to the conditions under which precautionary reasoning is 
appropriate and  
(2) ―in practice the rights of a possible (or ‗non-ostensible‘) agent must yield to the rights 
of an apparently definite (or ‗ostensible‘) agent‖ (Holm and Coggon 2009, 296).  
 
In addition, Holm and Coggon detect a bias towards humans in our work that they 
suggest explains the deficiencies in our use of precaution. 
 In this paper we will respond to these claims and statements associated with them. 
However, it is important at the outset to appreciate that we consider their critique to be 
fundamentally misguided because the thesis they attack is not one that we have ever 
presented. They allege that the argument we advance dictates, variously, that: 
 
as we do not ―know‖ for certain that something is not a moral agent, we do well to presume that it 
is. 
 
[a]s it is impossible for anyone to prove or disprove [that apparent non-agents are not agents] we 
should apply a version of the precautionary principle, and treat them as if they are agents. 
 
[there is a] practical and binding imperative [to] treat everything that might logically be an agent 
as an agent. 
 
if it is logically possible that an entity is an agent, it is morally proper to treat it as an agent. 
 
[precautionary reasoning] requires us to treat anything as if it were an agent so long as it is 
logically possible that it might be an agent. (Holm and Coggon 2009, 296, 298, 301, 303, and 
305, respectively) 
 
However, to distinguish clearly what we do argue for from this attribution it is necessary 
to present the argument itself in its proper context. 
  
 
The Precautionary Arguments and Their Aims and Consequences 
 
Gewirth‘s argument for the PGC (if sound, as we contend it is) establishes that all agents 
(beings with the capacity to pursue purposes voluntarily that they treat as reasons for their 
actions) must grant ―generic‖ rights (rights to conditions that are necessary for 
action/successful action regardless of the purposes involved) to all agents on pain of 
contradicting that they themselves are agents (Beyleveld 1991). This renders the PGC 
categorically binding on vulnerable
1
 agents in relation to those of their actions that affect 
other vulnerable agents. It is possible, however, to imagine a sceptical agent ―A‖ 
accepting this yet denying that the PGC has any practical application on the grounds that 
A is the only agent in the world. While many beings are presented to A‘s experience that 
behave as though they are agents, according to A, for all A knows they might be figments 
of A‘s imagination, and, even if they exist independently of A, they might be mindless 
automata and not agents at all. Supposing that they exist independently of A, to be agents 
they must have certain mental capacities (e.g., be able to experience pain and suffering; 
be self-conscious; be able to reason reflectively to some degree, etc.). But only A can 
know for certain that A has these capacities. Hence, claims A, while the PGC is 
categorically binding in theory, unless A can be shown to contradict that A is an agent by 
denying that those who behave as though they are agents actually are agents, the PGC has 
no categorically binding relevance in practice. 
 Precautionary reasoning entered our thinking, initially, merely as the basis of an 
adequate response to such a radical sceptic. The response begins by accepting and 
elaborating on the basis of A‘s scepticism. Confronted with B (who behaves/displays the 
capacity to behave as though B is an agent, and is hence an apparent or ostensible 
agent),
2
 there is, indeed, no way that A can know that B is an agent or that B is not an 
agent without making wholly untestable metaphysical assumptions. It is not merely that 
A has no way of knowing with certainty whether or not B is an agent. Behavioural 
capacities, and the physical/biological structures generally associated with them only 
provide any evidence of agency on specific metaphysical assumptions that are neither 
demonstrable as necessary truths (or necessary falsehoods) nor empirically testable in a 
non-circular way. However, the inferences A draws from this are unsound. If A supposes 
that B is an agent (and acts accordingly) and happens (unknowingly) to be wrong, then A 
does not violate the PGC. On the other hand, if A supposes that B is not an agent (and 
acts accordingly) and happens (again unknowingly) to be wrong, then A violates the 
PGC. Since the PGC is categorically binding on A, A must avoid violating the PGC at all 
costs whenever this is meaningful and possible. Since it is possible that B is an agent and 
                                                 
1
  That the PGC applies to vulnerable agents only is to be taken as read. Only beings capable of being 
harmed (which, in the framework of the PGC specifically means being capable of being deprived of 
the generic conditions of agency) are intelligible objects of moral concern, and only those capable of 
not complying with moral precepts are intelligible addressees of such precepts. See Beyleveld and 
Brownsword 2001, 114-117 for further explanation. 
2
  We will use the terms ―apparent‖ and ―ostensible‖ interchangeably in this paper. 
B behaves like an agent it is both meaningful and possible for A to treat B as an agent, in 
consequence of which A must treat B as an agent, on pain of being willing to violate the 
PGC, which A categorically may not entertain. A errs in thinking that in order to show 
that the PGC has practical application with categorically binding force it is necessary to 
demonstrate that A contradicts that A is an agent by denying that those who behave like 
agents actually are agents. In fact, it is only necessary to show that A fails to treat the 
PGC as categorically binding on agents (and, thereby contradicts that A is an agent) by 
failing to treat those who behave like as agents as agents; and this the precautionary 
argument establishes. Quite simply, this argument establishes that any agent must treat 
other (epistemically) possible agents who are able to behave as though they are agents 
(viz., ostensible agents) as agents whether or not they (unknowably for the agent) actually 
are agents, which means that they must be granted the generic rights by all agents. 
Furthermore, it entails that those behavioural capacities and associated 
physical/biological structures that provide evidence for ostensible agency must be taken 
morally (for precautionary reasons) as evidence (but not necessarily complete evidence) 
of agency in other beings by agents.
3
 
 The precautionary argument that we apply to apparent non-agents is developed from 
this basic precautionary argument and must be understood as such. This argument begins 
by asking us to suppose that A is confronted, not with an ostensible agent B, but with C 
(who does not behave/display the capacity to behave as though C is an agent, and hence 
is not an ostensible agent). Now, for the very reasons that A cannot know whether or not 
B is an agent, the fact that C does not appear to be an agent does not entail that C is not 
an agent. There are all sorts of reasons why C might be an agent yet not be able to display 
the behaviour to be expected of an agent. In short, just as B‘s ostensible agency does not 
(indeed, cannot) establish A‘s actual agency, so C‘s apparent non-agency does not (and 
cannot) establish C‘s non-agency. Hence, as in the case of B, whether A supposes that C 
is an agent or that C is not an agent, A can be mistaken and can never know what the true 
position is. So, just as with B, A can be wrong in supposing that C is not an agent when C 
happens to be an agent, or wrong in supposing that C is an agent when C happens not to 
be an agent. Does it, therefore, follow that because A is categorically required to comply 
with the PGC that A must treat C as an agent (and grant C the generic rights)? No! The 
primary argument, as we have already pointed out, does not require beings to be treated 
as agents on the mere possibility that they might be agents. It only requires only those 
possible agents who are ostensible agents to be treated as agents. This is quite simply 
because to treat a being as an agent is to grant it the generic rights and to impose the 
correlative generic duties on it. This, because both ―ought‖ and ―may‖ imply ―can‖, can 
                                                 
3
  This argument, which is, in effect, a moral argument for other minds, may surely be extended to 
provide a moral argument for rejecting radical scepticism about the existence of a ―real‖ world 
independent of ―my‖ senses. It is a necessary condition of there being other agents who can be harmed 
by my actions that any beings presented to my experience are not mere figments of my imagination but 
have a real physical existence. I can‘t prove that this is so by experience as I must suppose that there is 
a ―real‖ world for my experiences to evidence this. However, I also can‘t disprove it. However, for me 
to suppose that there is no such world is for me to suppose that I need not obey the PGC. But if I 
follow this and there is a ―real‖ world, I violate the PGC. On the other hand, if I suppose that there is a 
real world but there isn‘t then I do not violate the PGC. Hence, I must suppose that there is a ―real‖ 
world. If this is sound it supports Kant‘s claim (1788, 126-130) that practical reason has primacy over 
theoretical reason (though not for quite the same reasons or in quite the same way). 
only meaningfully be done with those who behave as agents or display the capacity to do 
so, which C does not. What we have contended is that precaution imposes duties on A to 
C (hence a moral status―but not rights―to C, as an object of a degree of moral concern 
to A) in proportion to (variously) the probability that C might be an agent under 
precaution; how easy it is to imagine that C is an agent; or how close C‘s observable 
characteristics approach those of an ostensible agent. These different indicators are not, 
strictly, alternatives. Rather, the idea that we have presented is that probability under 
precaution might be measured by how easy it is to imagine that C might be an agent, and 
that C‘s observable characteristics bear on this. Granted, these are vague and rather 
analogical ideas. But while the usefulness of precaution to actually assign a specific 
moral status rests on our ability to be precise about this, the cogency of the general idea 
does not. This is important because we have never claimed to have developed a precise 
tool that enables conflicts between the rights of ostensible agents and the interests of non-
ostensible agents to be accurately and objectively assessed in all situations, though we 
have identified some of the problems confronting such an assessment and discussed 
strategies for dealing with them, which will outline later (bearing in mind that Holm and 
Coggon make little reference to this).  
 
 
The Details of Holm and Coggon’s Claims Examined 
 
Insufficient attention is paid to when precautionary reasoning is appropriate 
 
Holm and Coggon make several claims that contribute to this contention. 
 
I. It is not enough that there must be a logical possibility of agency. There must be ―real 
uncertainty‖ about whether or not a being is or is not an agent before we need to take the 
possibility of agency seriously (Holm and Coggon 2009, 298). Indeed, if entities are very 
different from ostensible agents then it becomes almost meaningless to suggest that we 
should treat them as agents.  
 
Even the best effort at a bona fide judgment will leave us struggling to know what serves the 
interests of an embryo or a computer or a brick. When we are working within viewpoints of 
radical, or even fairly radical, limits of what we can know, the idea of even attempting to do what 
is morally right loses its meaning. (Holm and Coggon 2009, 305) 
 
First and foremost, this rests on falsely attributing to us the idea that the mere logical 
possibility that something is an agent requires us to treat it to at least some degree as 
though it were an agent. As we have already explained, precaution requires agents to treat 
other beings as agents only if and to the extent that it is possible/meaningful to do so. 
Strictly speaking it is only possible to treat ostensible agents as agents. In the case of 
beings that are not ostensible agents but have some characteristics that generate the 
generic interests that ostensible agents have it is possible and meaningful to respect those 
interests (though not as rights). Only in this non-literal sense is it possible to treat them 
(to a degree) as agents. 
 As far as even this non-literal sense is concerned, we agree entirely that it is farcical 
for us to contemplate acting in the interests of a brick, and it is for just this reason that 
precaution assigns no moral standing to bricks (as implied by the explicit example of 
tables cited in Pattinson 2002, 73). As far as computers are concerned, well it depends on 
just what the computers are able to do. Computers that start behaving like KIT in the 80‘s 
TV series Knight Rider have serious claims to be considered ostensible agents. As for 
embryos, well as living beings and potential ostensible agents it is perfectly meaningful 
to think of an embryo‘s life as an interest it has under precaution. We have a very good 
idea about what ending the life of an embryo as a hypothetical generic condition of action 
involves, because life is the same thing here whether or not the embryo is an agent. On 
the other hand we have no idea about what ending the life of a brick might be. 
 Secondly, it is worth pointing out that use of the notion of ―real uncertainty‖ that 
Holm and Coggon appeal to is question-begging in the context of the metaphysical 
scepticism that the argument is addressing. Holm and Coggon provide no examples of 
―real uncertainty‖ about agency as against mere logical possibility of agency, but do 
suggest that our method makes it 
 
difficult to sustain the divide between human ostensible agents (i.e., you and us) and other entities 
displaying very similar agency characteristics except human communication. In a context of 
profound epistemic uncertainty it must surely be the way of precaution to class many animals as 
ostensible agents and not just as possible agents. (Holm and Coggon 2009, 303) 
 
This leads us to the conjecture that perhaps they would say that there is ―real uncertainty‖ 
about the agency of chimpanzees or dolphins, but only a logical possibility of agency in 
the case of rocks. But, if this is fair, why is there ―real uncertainty‖ about chimpanzees? 
On the premises of radical scepticism no agent can know that there are other agents. The 
ability to display agency behaviour does not bear on an agent‘s knowledge of the agency 
of another being, and this is the case whether or not an agent is dealing with another 
human being, a chimpanzee, a dog, a plant, a computer, or a rock. As a matter of 
knowledge, the agency of all of these is equally uncertain and equally logically possible. 
What variations in agency-like behaviour, etc, bear on is merely an agent‘s ability to treat 
another being as though it were an agent (in the sense we have just explained). Further, 
we distinguish between at least four qualitatively different levels of relevant behavioural 
display (within the second and third of which there can be quantitative differences): 
 
1. Beings that clearly behave like agents (apparent/ostensible) agents (e.g., ―normal‖ 
adult human beings; androids/robots of the sophistication displayed in the film 
Blade Runner or I Robot; hypothetical non-human animals or plants that behave 
like agents) 
2. Beings that we are uncertain behave like agents (e.g., or so we personally judge, 
human children at early stages of communicative competence; dolphins; whales; 
non-human primates; some birds) 
3. Beings that do not quite behave like agents but have some of the behavioural 
capacities that apparent agents display; i.e., that have necessary but not sufficient 
observable characteristics to be classified as ostensible agents (which, arguably, 
includes, whether adult or not, dogs, cats, pigs, horses, cattle, sheep, earthworms, 
plants, bacteria; computers with some self-regulating functions) 
4. Beings that do not behave like agents and exhibit no behavioural capacities of 
ostensible agents (e.g., rocks) (Beyleveld and Pattinson 2000, Beyleveld and 
Brownsword 2001, esp. 124, and Pattinson 2002, esp. 73). 
 
To these we need to add at least three other categories: living beings who have displayed 
the behavioural capacities of agents (e.g., persons in a persistent vegetative state); those 
with the potential to display these capacities (e.g., human embryos; human babies and 
very young children); and deceased previously ostensible agents (whose bodies fall under 
4; but who as speculative continuing spirits might still exist as ostensible agents). These 
we place outside of the hierarchy simply because it is unclear just where we would place 
them as general classes.
4
 
 At level 1 we can treat the beings as agents in all respects. Specifically we can grant 
them all the rights of the PGC and impose all its duties on them. At levels 2 and 3 we can 
identify interest-protecting actions that refer to interests beings would have rights to if 
they are agents. At level 2 it is unclear if we can impose the PGC‘s duties on them fairly 
and unclear whether they are capable of releasing others who can respect their interests 
from duties to protect these interests (so unclear whether we can grant them the generic 
rights under the will-conception of rights that the PGC deals in). At level 3, it is clear that 
we cannot grant them the generic rights or impose the generic duties on them. At level 4 
we cannot, as Holm and Coggon state, even meaningfully get a handle on what actions 
would affect/protect their relevant interests (putative rights). 
 
II. Because the precautionary thesis requires us to treat embryos as agents because they 
tend to become ostensible agents, it renders our view akin to John Finnis‘ (Finnis 1995, 
30–35) according to which all humans share a radical (potential) capacity for choice and 
so are to be granted full moral status even if they individually are unable to display those 
characteristics, such as a capacity for choice, that grant this status (Holm and Coggon 
2009, 302) 
 Finnis‘ view is undoubtedly fallacious within our framework at least, simply because 
there being a potential agent can only grant potential rights not rights themselves. But 
nowhere do we claim that, e.g., human embryos, have any generic rights, let alone 
generic rights equivalent to those of a normal adult human being, on the grounds that they 
are potential agents, and there is nothing in our precautionary thesis that requires us to do 
so. What we do claim is that human embryos have a minimal moral status (meaning that 
agents have minimal moral duties to them) on the grounds that they have the potential to 
become ostensible agents. Why so? Because precaution driven by a categorical 
imperative requires us to treat ostensible agents as agents (to regard sufficient evidence 
for ostensible agency as sufficient evidence of agency for practical purposes).
5
 
Consequently it requires us to regard those items that are jointly sufficient evidence of 
ostensible agency (hence agency), but individually not sufficient evidence, as some 
(albeit insufficient) evidence of ostensible agency (hence agency). At the same time, 
insufficient evidence does not preclude the possibility that the being in question is an 
                                                 
4
  Further categories can be created by reference to qualifications of this sort to applicable categories 
other than level 1.   
5
  We will not repeat the qualification ―for practical purposes‖. It should be taken as read in the 
precautionary framework. 
agent. In other words, insufficient evidence for ostensible agency (hence agency) is not 
sufficient evidence of non-agency, even though it is sufficient evidence of ostensible non-
agency. The crucial claim now is that, in this context, agents must think of potential 
ostensible agency as providing some (though clearly insufficient) evidence, not for 
ostensible agency, but for agency. Why?  Beyleveld (2000, 73–75) suggested, and this is 
referred to by Holm and Coggon (2009, 302-303), that this is because all things being 
equal, it is more likely that a being with the species potential to develop ostensible 
agency actually is an agent than is one without this species potential. This is because 
potential ostensible agency either reduces the number of speculative (but coherent) 
hypotheses that need to be advanced in order to account for a hypothetical presumption 
that the being actually is an agent but is not able to display ostensible agency, or else 
makes more plausible speculative hypotheses that would provide such an account. For 
example, the idea that a human embryo actually is an agent could be true on the basis of 
the metaphysical doctrine of metempsychosis coupled with the idea of locked-in agency. 
Such a scenario is surely more ―plausible‖ if we are dealing with beings that have the 
species-capacity to develop ostensible agency than when we are dealing with beings that 
do not. At the same time, this hypothesis is so speculative that only extremely minimal 
status can be assigned on its basis alone. 
 
III. Characteristics short of agency-qualifying do not render it more likely that an entity 
actually is an agent. Agency is an intrinsic property not one that can be assigned. We 
wrongly suppose that epistemic uncertainty bears on agency itself. 
 
Agency is all or nothing. . . . [I]t is not something that an entity is given by a Gewirthian; it is 
intrinsic. And the chances of an entity being an agent are not affected by the assessment of 
ostensible characteristics and their relationship to commensurate levels of protection. (Holm and 
Coggon 2009, 304)
6
 
 
If Holm and Coggon are referring to the case of ostensible agents then the problem is that 
we do not hold that the bearing of the assessment of ostensible characteristics is on 
whether or not an entity is an agent as such or even on knowledge of this. The bearing is 
on whether it is rationally required (within the framework of the PGC) to treat the entity 
as an agent (whatever it might actually be). In this context, ―agency‖ is assignable to 
ostensible agents for practical purposes (i.e., for practical purposes, ostensible agents are 
to be thought of as agents), because while it is not within the power of precaution to 
either make something an agent or even to provide us with knowledge that it is an agent, 
it is open to us to treat or mistreat what is or is not an agent in a morally relevant way, 
and the epistemic and moral considerations that interplay in the precautionary argument 
have a direct bearing on the rationality of our actions here. 
 But, surely, it might be said, there is an objection here to the idea we have just 
advanced under II that observable characteristics like potential ostensible agency provide 
some evidence for agency (which is to say make it more likely/probable that a non-
ostensible agent is an agent). However, the important thing to appreciate here is that the 
                                                 
6
  In this passage they say that reference to ―partial‖ agency is a red herring. But we only refer to partial 
agents as non-agents and our reasoning works exclusively on ostensible agency and non-ostensible 
agency and necessary/sufficient conditions to assign ostensible agency, never on partial agency. 
bearing of observable characteristics is not on the objective probability of a non-
ostensible agent being an agent. Probability under precaution, even when it refers to the 
idea of actual agency (which is a standing possibility), is a construct driven by the 
imperative to do what can be done to respect the PGC (i.e., to guard against the 
possibility of violating the PGC in a proportionate manner). The very idea of protecting 
against the possibility of violating the PGC in relation to non-ostensible as well as 
ostensible agents rests on the idea that they might possibly be agents. In other words, the 
application of precautionary reasoning is regulated by the idea of possible agency which 
means the idea of a chance of actual agency. The PGC seeks to protect the generic 
conditions/capacities of agency of agents, and possession of the generic capacities 
(though not of the generic rights) is a matter of degree. Precaution does require agents to 
respect the correlative generic interests of non-ostensible agents as well as ostensible 
agents on the ground that there is a chance that they are agents. Since the range of 
meaningful actions to protect generic interests is correlative to the display of generic 
capacities and associated characteristics, protection that can be given is proportionate to 
the degree to which these capacities and characteristics are displayed. At root, 
precautionary probability of agency is proportionate to the range and nature of the 
generic interests that can plausibly/intelligibly be protected. In the context of precaution, 
it is neither unnatural nor improper to think of an ostensible agent as having a ‗chance‘ of 
being an agent of 1, while a rock might be thought of as having a ‗chance‘ of 0, 7 and of 
other non-ostensible agents as having a ‗chance‘ of being agents >0<1, even if we cannot 
assign any other cardinal values. And, once we do this, then it follows (schematically) 
that the precautionary probability of being an agent tracks the ostensible generic 
capacities we are able to identify.  Ceteris paribus, it is easier to imagine that a potential 
ostensible agent actually is an agent than a non-ostensible agent lacking this potential 
(see the example under II above). This, we suggest, is because it facilitates (however 
slightly) our ability to form a picture in which the idea of, e.g., a human embryo, having 
generic agency interests is rendered intelligible. And this (schematically) affects the 
precautionary probability of a non-ostensible agent being an agent.    
 
 
Our position means that the interests of a possible agent must always yield to the rights 
of an ostensible agent, which makes it practically useless 
 
Holm and Coggon suggest that even if there is a workable and coherent way of granting 
proportional status to non-ostensible agents, in practice, where there is a conflict, the 
rights of ostensible agents will always override the interests of non-ostensible agents, 
thus making the precautionary thesis 
 
Nothing more than a redundant token gesture to admit that the less probable agents may 
nevertheless have been worthy of protection. (Holm and Coggon 2009, 305) 
 
To back this up, they refer to a discussion in Beyleveld and Brownsword 2001 of the case 
of a patient in PVS, where it was stated that there are three possible grounds to attempt to 
                                                 
7
  The critical remarks about mathematical probability that Holm and Coggon make (2009, 304–305) 
ignore this limitation. 
justify withdrawal, despite precautionary protection (as an ex-ostensible agent): to fulfil 
an obligation to the patient when he or she was an ostensible agent (e.g., under a living 
will); or as a permissible fulfilment of a preference that the ostensible agent was known 
to have; or as a reallocation of resources to protect the generic interests (rights) of other 
living ostensible agents. 
 They (not Beyleveld and Brownsword, who presented these as considerations to be 
weighed without making a judgment about the weighting) contend that 
 
All things being equal, it seems unlikely that a sound assessment of resource allocation is going 
to ―favour‖ the individual in the persistent vegetative state over the ostensible agent whose 
dialysis can not be funded, or who can‘t find an NHS dentist to register with. (Holm and Coggon 
2009, 306) 
 
Perhaps (and they make similar remarks about an example they provide about treatment 
of baby Charlotte Wyatt and also comments made by Beyleveld and Brownsword, 2007 
about use of organs from the dead: Holm and Coggon 2009, 306–307); but even if 
precautionary reasoning would yield the conclusion they suggest in these cases (and this 
is by no means straightforward), this is no basis for stating that precautionary reasoning 
would entail that the rights of ostensible agents will always trump the interests of non-
ostensible agents. Such judgments must necessarily be made on a case-by-case basis and 
Holm and Coggon do not pay attention to the analysis of the problems of weighting that 
we have presented in numerous places. 
 This is not the place to rehearse our analysis of these problems in detail. Suffice it to 
say that we have argued that precautionary reasoning does not provide us with any 
straightforward answers to conflicts between the rights of ostensible agents and the 
interests of non-ostensible agents except where there is a one-variable conflict. By a one-
variable conflict we mean (here) a conflict is between the same interest of an ostensible 
agent and a non-ostensible agent. In such a conflict, the issue is settled in favour of the 
ostensible agent simply because the ostensible agent has a higher moral status under 
precaution. However, once the interests are different (compare the interests endangered 
by the removal of life-sustaining nutrition and hydration with those endangered by the 
denial of NHS funded dental care) what needs to be weighed is the product of the 
ostensible agent‘s interest and status against the product of the non-ostensible agent‘s 
interest and status. If this is to be done in any precise manner cardinal values must be 
assigned to both the degree of moral status of an entity and the value of a generic interest. 
Now, while Gewirth‘s criterion of degree of needfulness for action provides a handle on 
assessing what generic interests are more important than others, it does not assign 
cardinal values to the ordering. Furthermore, except in the case of an ostensible agent 
(with full moral status correlated with a precautionary probability of agency of 1) and 
non-ostensible agents like rocks (with no moral status, hence a precautionary probability 
of agency of 0), while it seems clear (whatever measure of precautionary probability we 
use) that the precautionary moral status of a chimpanzee is higher than that of a human 
embryo, it does not enable us to state in mathematical terms just how much higher. To 
this must be added the fact that it is far from clear that scales of moral status 
(precautionary probability) and scales of interest value can be rendered commensurable 
in a non-arbitrary way.
8
 If they cannot be rendered commensurable then we have argued 
that practical solutions must be left to the ―indirect application‖ of the PGC, which is to 
say that it must be left to the good faith, transparent, and accountable judgment of 
persons authorised under the PGC to make such judgments (e.g., Beyleveld and 
Brownsword 2001, 255-258). 
 This by no means entails that we must ―paralyse ourselves with matters such as 
deciding whether killing bacteria will breach their logically possible generic rights‖ 
(Holm and Coggon 2009, 308). Above we indicated that there can be quantitative 
differences in the behavioural display of beings that do not quite behave like agents but 
have some of the behavioural capacities that ostensible agents display (level 3 above). 
These quantitative differences are to be interpreted by reference to the tenets of the PGC, 
as applied via precautionary reasoning. Bacteria display the patterned organismic 
behaviour common to all living creatures, but it seems to that they do not display (and 
this is a scientific claim) behaviour that evidences (a) being motivated by feeling or 
desire, (b) intelligent and thereby susceptible to learning by experience, or (c) value-
guided, and characteristic of an agent (Beyleveld and Brownsword 2001, 124; Pattinson 
2002, 26 and 73). Thus, bacteria represent possible agents displaying behaviour that only 
minimally approaches that of ostensible agents, albeit (in this sense agent-related) 
behaviour that goes beyond that displayed by rocks. Further, as Holm and Coggon 
recognise, for ostensible agents to attempt to protect the generic interests that bacteria 
have in continued life (should they actually be agents) would typically prevent ostensible 
agents from exercising any of their own generic rights. As one of us has noted elsewhere, 
we unavoidably kill living cells when we scratch, bacteria when we wash, and insects 
when we travel (Pattinson 2002, 73). Nonetheless, a person making a good faith attempt 
to apply the PGC should conclude that even the most basic (presumed) generic interests 
of entities displaying only patterned organismic behaviour can be treated as if they are 
overridden by any generic interest of an ostensible agent.
9
 The application of the PGC 
through precautionary reasoning cannot necessitate suicidal martyrdom. To conclude 
otherwise would be to ignore the justificatory structure of the PGC, in which agents are 
first shown to contradict that they are agents by not holding that that they themselves 
have the generic rights, as a necessary premise in the demonstration that agents contradict 
that they are agents if they do not grant the generic rights to all other agents (Beyleveld 
1991, 56-61). In contrast, it is often possible to protect the generic interests of entities 
displaying greater behavioural capacities without thereby necessitating suicidal 
martyrdom. 
 Now, while we do not claim that precautionary reasoning is a cure-all for all hard 
cases where we have to weigh the interests of ostensible and non-ostensible agents, it 
should be very clear that the situation is much more complex and nuanced than Holm and 
Coggon depict.  
 
                                                 
8
  We have not altogether precluded that there might be a way of rendering them commensurable: and 
there seems to be some prospect of this if precautionary probability is operationalised in terms of 
identifiable generic interests. However, there are complexities here and this is not the moment to create 
hostages to fortune by presenting a sketchy analysis that has not been fully thought through. 
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  Such entities would still require protection against non-generic concerns—mere whims not connected 
with the maintenance or advancement of an ostensible agent‘s generic features. 
 There is evidence in our writing of a bias towards humans that may explain our 
position 
 
As Holm and Coggon fully appreciate, Gewirth‘s theory is strictly a theory about the 
rights of agents not a theory about the rights of human agents alone. This led to one of us 
employing ―it‖ as the pronoun for agents (Beyleveld 1991, 15) and we have jointly and 
separately continued this practice in subsequent works. Agents need not be gendered 
beings. Nor need they even be biological entities as this is commonly understood. Agents 
are defined by generic capacities to act, and anything with these capacities has the 
generic rights. They also appreciate that when this is coupled with the precautionary 
theses we advance, the list of generic rights holders includes every vulnerable being with 
the capacity to act (to do something voluntarily for a purpose that it treats as the reason 
for its behaviour), and it is logically possible for anything that could be such an entity to 
be a generic rights-holder. Hence even rocks are logically possible-rights-holders. 
 Now, on the one hand, their critique is that this gives the thesis an impossibly broad 
scope (Holm and Coggon 2009, 303, 308). To this, we have consistently replied that it 
does so only on the premise that the thesis requires us to treat logically possible agents as 
agents, which is not our position or entailed by our precautionary arguments. But on the 
other hand they claim that we sometimes (though they sometimes seem to attribute this to 
the precautionary thesis itself, which is wholly untenable) display a species bias in our 
writing (Holm and Coggon 2009, 303). For this they provide the following evidence:  
 
(a) The ―it‖ convention is not consistently adhered to, because on occasion Gewirthians 
(Beyleveld and Brownsword 2007) employ gendered pronouns (Holm and Coggon 
2009, 299). 
(b)  Gewirthians have claimed that there is that no more fundamental right than the right 
to life. But if robots are not to be ruled out (as the thesis requires) then we should 
refer to existence not to life (Holm and Coggon 2009, 299). 
(c)  We deny many animals the status of ostensible agents (Holm and Coggon 2009, 303-
304). 
 
As regards departures from the ―it‖ convention, it is entirely appropriate to do this in a 
context in which it is clear that we are not dealing with beings other than human beings, 
who are gendered, and this is the case in the examples they cite. Some men and women 
would, indeed, take it as an insult to be addressed directly as ―It‖. 
 As regards the use of the term ―life‖ rather than ―existence‖, this is, in the first 
instance, an arbitrary terminological point. A robot that is a self-aware agent would 
probably have no difficulty thinking of actions that permanently terminate its functions as 
ending its life or killing it. To take an example from fiction: the robot in the film Short 
Circuit declares its self-awareness by the phrase ―No. 5 is alive‖. So nothing whatever 
can be inferred from this. Secondly, any bias towards biological terms (were one to be 
present) is not a bias towards humans as they are not the only biological entities. 
  As regards the denial of ostensible agency to non-human animals, while it is true that 
we do not consider that dogs and cats, for example, are ostensible agents, this is not 
because they lack any specifically human characteristics (like human language). What it 
is necessary is the display of the vulnerable capacity to do things voluntarily for purposes 
that are reasons for one‘s behaviour. We just happen to judge (and this is largely a 
scientific matter) that dogs and cats do not have this capacity. As we have said, we think 
that in relation to dolphins, chimpanzees, and a number of other animals, the evidence for 
ostensible agency is inconclusive. 
 
 
Concluding Remarks 
 
The charge of violating the ―principle of augmentative consistency‖ (Holm and Coggon 
2009, 301) would be properly made out against a position that had all the features 
attributed to our use of precautionary reasoning by Holm and Coggon. They are surely 
right to insist that a theory that required all possible agents to be treated as agents, 
literally rather than metaphorically, could not consistently claim to be action-guiding. 
They are surely also right that the consistent application of a theory that rests possession 
of moral status on properties that are not necessarily connected to membership of a 
particular species cannot favour humans over non-humans, where those non-humans 
display the relevant properties. However, Holm and Coggon‘s characterisation of our use 
of precautionary reasoning sets up a straw man and often departs from what we might 
label the principle of charitable interpretation, which requires that those we criticise be 
interpreted so as to render what they say as rational as possible.
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 We have greatly benefitted from the opportunity to give this reply and thereby 
address any misunderstandings that have been created by the way we have chosen to 
express ourselves in print. We willingly acknowledge that the nature of our precautionary 
thesis is such that it is often very difficult to accurately express it without using 
convoluted language and neologisms. The problem of other minds, as advanced by the 
radical sceptic, is often linguistically sidelined by it being commonplace to express 
oneself as if the epistemic gap did not exist, probably because it is counterintuitive and 
few theorists consider it amenable to solution. Distinguishing the concept of an agent 
from that of a being displaying all the behaviour expected of an agent is difficult 
enough—perhaps ―apparent agent‖ is a better term than ―ostensible agent‖. But as soon 
as one tries to describe other entities as possible agents and describe beings approaching 
ostensible or apparent agency, the required language departs even further from common, 
and even established philosophical, parlance. It is therefore all too easy to lapse into 
language that is more metaphorical and elegant than strictly accurate.  
 Even allowing that some of our phrasing and terminology might not have best 
communicated our position, however, it is good academic practice for critics to attempt to 
interpret a theory in accordance with its own tenets and only accept an interpretation 
leading to inconsistency when no other is plausible. Our reliance on the principle that 
―ought‖ and ―may‖ implies ―can‖ (e.g. Beyleveld and Pattinson 2000, 48) surely points 
                                                 
10
  Holm and Coggon (2009, footnote 5) violate this principle very clearly when they accuse Beyleveld 
and Brownsword (2001, 253) of a non-sequitur that depends on interpreting ―allows for X to be held‖  
not as meaning  ―not excluding the possibility of  holding X‖  but as meaning  ―requiring X to be 
held‖. While they claim that this is the natural reading, this is so much not the case in ordinary English, 
and it would have been so easy to have said ―requires‖ if that is what was meant, that the only reason 
they can have for attributing their reading is that it enables them advance a criticism that they would be 
otherwise unable to make.  
against interpreting us as holding that we are morally required to treat every possible 
agent as an agent even when this is meaningless or inconsistent with an agent exercising 
its own generic rights. Similarly, our repeated and explicit use of what Holm and Coggon 
recognise as a ceteris paribus rider should make critics wary of generalising from 
particular applications of precautionary reasoning to reach conclusions where further 
variables apply. 
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